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Non-Technical Summary
Establishing a new firm is a complex process which comprises many tasks. A com-
mon assumption in the theoretical literature on entrepreneurship is therefore that
interdisciplinarity is important for successfully running a new firm. Empirically
it is still an open question whether interdisciplinarity is a success factor of new
firms. In this paper, I analyse whether interdisciplinarity of the founders of aca-
demic spinoffs is important for the employment growth of these firms. Academic
spinoffs are spinoffs from universities and other research institutes. For these
firms interdisciplinarity may be especially important as it is not only relevant for
running the firm but also as a basis for the business idea itself.
In detail, the following groups of academic spinoffs are compared with respect
to employment growth: a) team foundations versus single entrepreneurs, b) sin-
gle entrepreneurs who studied several subjects versus single entrepreneurs who
studied only one subject, c) team foundations whose members studied different
subjects versus team foundations whose members all studied the same subject,
and d) team foundations whose members all come from the same type of research
institution versus team foundations whose members come from different types of
research institutions. These comparisons are made using a data set on academic
spinoffs in Germany.
The results of this paper show that employment growth of academic spinoffs is
higher when the firm is founded by a team than when it is founded by a single
entrepreneur. Team foundations of engineers have higher employment growth
when they have a business scientist among them. However, heterogeneity with
respect to the subjects studied per se and with respect to the institution of
academic origin is irrelevant for the employment growth of academic spinoffs.
Thus, interdisciplinarity appears not to be an important success factor of new
firms.
Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze
Die Errichtung eines neuen Unternehmens ist eine vielschichtige Angelegenheit
mit vielen Aufgaben. In der theoretischen Literatur zu Entrepreneurship wird
deswegen im Allgemeinen angenommen, dass Interdisziplinarita¨t wichtig fu¨r den
Erfolg neuer Unternehmen ist. Empirisch ist dies aber eine immer noch offene
Frage. In diesem Papier untersuche ich deswegen, ob Interdisziplinarita¨t der
Gru¨nder von akademischen Spinoffs relevant fu¨r das Bescha¨ftigungswachstum
dieser Unternehmen ist. Akadamische Spinoffs sind Ausgru¨ndungen aus Univer-
sita¨ten und anderen Forschungseinrichtungen. Fu¨r diese Unternehmen sollte In-
terdisziplinarita¨t eine besondere Rolle spielen, da sie nicht nur relevant ist fu¨r das
Fu¨hren des Unternehmens, sondern auch als Basis fu¨r die Gescha¨ftsidee selbst.
Im Einzelnen werden folgende Gruppen von akademischen Spinoffs hinsichtlich
ihres Bescha¨ftigungswachstums miteinander verglichen: a) Einzelgru¨ndungen ver-
sus Teamgru¨ndungen, b) Einzelgru¨nder, die mehrere Fa¨cher studiert haben versus
Einzelgru¨nder, die nur ein Fach studiert haben, c) Teamgru¨ndungen, deren Mit-
glieder unterschiedliche Fa¨cher studiert haben versus Teamgru¨ndungen, deren
Mitglieder alle dasselbe Fach studiert haben und d) Teamgru¨ndungen, deren
Mitglieder alle von demselben Typ Forschungseinrichtung kommen versus Team-
gru¨ndungen, deren Mitglieder von unterschiedlichen Typen von Forschungsein-
richtungen kommen. Diese Vergleiche werden mithilfe von Daten u¨ber akademis-
che Spinoffs in Deutschland durchgefu¨hrt.
Die Ergebnisse dieses Papiers zeigen, dass akademische Spinoffs, die im Team
gegru¨ndet werden, ein ho¨heres Bescha¨ftigungswachstum haben als akademische
Spinoffs, die von Einzelpersonen gegru¨ndet werden. Teamgru¨ndungen von In-
genieuren sind erfolgreicher, wenn sie einen Wirtschaftswissenschaftler im Team
haben. Heterogenita¨t hinsichtlich der studierten Fa¨cher an sich und hinsichtlich
der akademischen Herkunft der Gru¨nder hat jedoch keinen Einfluss auf das Be-
scha¨ftigungswachstum von akadamischen Spinoffs. Interdisziplinarita¨t scheint
also kein bedeutender Erfolgsfaktor fu¨r neue Unternehmen zu sein.
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1 Introduction
A common assumption in the theoretical literature on entrepreneurship is that
interdisciplinarity is important for successfully running a new firm. Lazear (2005)
claims that single entrepreneurs must have knowledge in different areas, and Fabel
(2004) uses a model in which firm success depends on the knowledge and abilities
of the different individuals in the team that performs the essential tasks of the
firm. There is some evidence that interdisciplinarity increases the probability to
become an entrepreneur. Lazear (2005) and Wagner (2006) find that individuals
are the more likely to found a firm the more diverse their educational background
is.
However, it is empirically still an open question whether interdisciplinarity is
a success factor of new firms. So far, there is no evidence for firms founded
by single entrepreneurs and for firms founded by teams, the results are mixed.
Ensley, Carland, and Carland (1998) and Ensley and Amason (1999) find that
heterogeneity in the subjects studied has a negative effect on the level of sales,
but no effect on sales growth and profitability. Zimmerman (2008) finds a positive
effect of the same variable on the amount of capital that the firms obtain at their
initial public offering, and Amason, Shrader, and Tompson (2006) report no effect
on sales growth, profitability and market performance (net return to shareholders
in the 3-year period after initial public offering).
In this paper, I analyse whether interdisciplinarity of the founders of academic
spinoffs is important for the employment growth of these firms. Academic spinoffs
are spinoffs from universities and other research institutes. They are considered
to be important for economic growth because they are a vehicle for spreading
new ideas. Often, new ideas emerge by recombining existing knowledge, which
could be encouraged by different knowledge backgrounds of the involved persons.
Thus, for these firms interdisciplinarity may be especially important as it is not
only relevant for running the firm but also as a basis for the business idea itself.
As theoretical basis for the derivation of the hypotheses, the models by Lazear
(2005) and Fabel (2004) mentioned above are used. To my knowledge, these are
the only formal theories that consider the effects of the composition of human cap-
ital for new firms. Lazear focusses on single entrepreneurs whereas Fabel allows
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for the possibility that firms are founded by teams. These two models suggest
to compare the following groups of firms with respect to employment growth: a)
team foundations versus single entrepreneurs, b) single entrepreneurs who stud-
ied several subjects versus single entrepreneurs who studied only one subject, c)
team foundations whose members studied different subjects versus team foun-
dations whose members all studied the same subject, and d) team foundations
whose members all have the same level of ability versus team foundations whose
members have different levels of ability. The outcome of this analysis is relevant
for developing guidelines to set up promising start-ups. But it also concerns ed-
ucation policy as it indicates whether universities should set up interdisciplinary
curricula when aiming at fostering academic spinoffs.
One reason for the inconclusive results of the existing studies is that they rely
on rather small data sets. The most extensive data set used has just 174 ob-
servations, which could lead to imprecise estimates. Furthermore, the existing
results are presumably based on selected samples as the authors only observe
surviving firms. As firm performance and survival are not independent (Dunne,
Roberts, and Samuelson (1989)), estimates based only on surviving firms are po-
tentially biased. In this paper, I use the ZEW spinoff survey, which contains
educational information on the founders of roughly 3,000 academic spinoffs in
Germany. Additionally, it is possible to use information on non-surviving firms
founded in research and knowledge intensive sectors to correct for the bias arising
from the fact that the effect of heterogeneity in educations can only be calculated
for surviving firms.
The results of this paper show that employment growth of academic spinoffs is
higher when the firm is founded by a team than when it is founded by a single
entrepreneur. Team foundations of engineers have higher employment growth
when they have a business scientist among them. However, heterogeneity with
respect to the subjects studied per se and with respect to the institution of
academic origin is irrelevant for the employment growth of academic spinoffs.
Thus, it is only important that several persons are involved, but it is by and
large negligible who matches with whom to set up the firm.
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The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical approaches
by Lazear (2005) and Fabel (2004) and develops the hypotheses for the empirical
analysis. Section 3 describes the data set and the relevant variables. Section
4 presents the estimation method. Section 5 shows the results, and Section 6
concludes.
2 Theory and Hypotheses
In this section, the hypotheses for the empirical analysis are developed. They
are based on the jack-of-all-trades model by Lazear (2005) and the partnership
model of entrepreneurship by Fabel (2004). These theories make statements
about the probability to become an entrepreneur and about the equilibrium size
of firms. The approaches are therefore extended in order to derive hypotheses
about employment growth.
2.1 The “Jack-of-all-Trades” Model
Lazear (2005) views entrepreneurs as persons whose primary task is to bring
together different factors of production for creating a new product or producing
an old product at lower costs. They “must possess the ability to combine talents
and manage those of others” (Lazear (2005), p. 650). In order to be able to fulfil
such a task, entrepreneurs must have knowledge in different areas. Lazear (2005)
therefore assumes that entrepreneurs need the full range of their skills and that
income depends on the skill with which the entrepreneurs are least endowed. This
is in contrast to employees who can exploit their best skill to generate income. As
a consequence, individuals with a balanced skill profile (jack-of-all-trades) choose
to become entrepreneurs and individuals with one outstanding skill choose to
become employees.
If the jack-of-all-trades argument applies, individuals have different investment
strategies in education depending on their skill profile. Individuals with a clear
imbalanced skill profile invest in only one of their skills because they will use only
one of their skills in future work. In contrast, individuals with a more balanced
skill profile either do not invest, invest in the skill with which they are least
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endowed or invest in more than one skill. This depends on the investment costs
in human capital they face. Thus, following Lazear, the two types of individuals
can be distinguished empirically by the breadth of their investment in human
capital.1 In this paper, the breadth of investment in human capital is measured
by the fact whether or not an individual has studied several subjects.
For analysing who will become an entrepreneur (which is the concern of Lazear),
this reasoning straightforwardly transforms into the hypothesis that individu-
als with a broad human capital investment strategy are more likely to become
entrepreneurs. Concerning employment growth, the case is a little bit more com-
plicated as it is not clear who is observed when we look at an individual with
only one subject studied given that she founded a firm: someone with an unbal-
anced skill profile who “wrongly” chose to become an entrepreneur or someone
with a balanced skill profile whose investment costs in education are such that
she only chose to study one subject. This leads to different hypotheses about the
relationship between heterogeneity in educations and employment growth from
the jack-of-all-trades model. One is
H1a: Given start-up size, firms founded by single entrepreneurs who studied
only one subject have lower employment growth than firms founded by single en-
trepreneurs who studied more than one subject.
This hypothesis applies if individuals face some uncertainty about their skill
profile which makes it necessary that they actually start a firm before they know
whether their skill profile is sufficiently balanced. If the actual skill profile is only
revealed incrementally, the unsuitable entrepreneur will not shut down overnight
but may will first reduce employment in order to reduce costs.2
The contrasting hypothesis is
H1b: Given start-up size, firms founded by single entrepreneurs who studied
only one subject have equal employment growth as firms founded by single en-
trepreneurs who studied more than one subject.
1A more direct strategy would be to use information on test scores from school. This
information is neither available for the paper by Lazear nor for this paper.
2This reasoning is similar to Jovanovic (1982) who models the evolution of the size structure
of an industry as a process of noisy selection. Firms do not know their efficiency at the outset but
become acquainted with it through learning. Efficient firms grow, and inefficient firms decline.
Almus (2004) finds empirically that exiting firms indeed shrink before they close down.
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This hypothesis applies if the observed entrepreneurs all have a sufficiently bal-
anced skill profile but for some, the investment costs are such that they can
invest in more than one skill whereas for others, it is only beneficial to raise their
weakest skill to the level of their other skills.
A drawback of the jack-of-all-trades model is that it allows predictions only about
single entrepreneurs. In teams, it is possible that the weaknesses of one team
member is compensated by the strengths of another. But this is implicitly ruled
out in the jack-of-all-trades model. Alternatively, Fabel (2004) presents an ap-
proach which also permits team foundations.
2.2 The Partnership Model of Entrepreneurship
In his model, Fabel (2004) adopts the O-ring production function approach of
Kremer (1993). According to this theory, the performance of each task in a
project is essential.3 If any member of the team that performs the essential tasks
makes a considerable mistake, the project fails. The project success therefore
depends crucially on the ability of the team members.
The O-ring theory implies that there is a unique optimal team size for each
firm and that team foundations have more employees than single entrepreneurs
in equilibrium. This approach therefore allows to formulate a hypothesis with
respect to the question whether or not the relevant knowledge should be provided
by different persons. If start-up size is equal for both single entrepreneurs and
team foundations and if it is below optimal size, team foundations should have
higher employment growth than single entrepreneurs. The second hypothesis is
therefore
H2: Given start-up size, firms founded by teams experience higher employment
growth than firms founded by single entrepreneurs.
Fabel (2004) assumes that each task requires exactly one person. This is a rather
strong assumption as it rules out the cases that one individual can perform sev-
3The O-ring approach got its name from the accident of the space shuttle Challenger which
exploded because of the malfunctioning of only one of its components: the O-rings of the
booster. This event is used as a metaphor for production processes in which everything has to
work sufficiently well for the project to be a success.
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eral tasks and several individuals are assigned to one task. However, with this
assumption it can be conjectured that teams whose members have acquired sim-
ilar types of skills (“specialised teams” in the following) are more likely to split
up on the way to equilibrium because the skills of their members are redundant.
Teams whose members obtained different skills (“generalistic teams” in the fol-
lowing) can rely on a broader basis which could help them to better run and grow
the business. Thus, assuming again that the start-up size of the firms is smaller
than their optimal size, the third hypothesis is
H3: Given start-up size, firms founded by generalistic teams experience higher
employment growth than firms founded by specialised teams.
A further implication of the O-ring theory is that in competitive labour markets,
teams are homogeneous with respect to the ability of their members. The reason
is that the abilities of the team members are complementary, i.e. the marginal
productivity of the ability of one team member increases in the abilities of the
other team members. This implies that a team consisting of individuals with
the highest ability level in the population can benefit the most from an equally
able team member for a further task and will therefore offer the highest wage.
Firms with medium ability individuals cannot successfully compete for higher able
individuals but are successful in attracting medium ability individuals compared
to firms with lower average ability level. This leads to homogeneity in the ability
levels of all individuals within firms.
This sorting mechanism requires that abilities are observable. If, however, abil-
ities are not perfectly observable at the outset, it is possible that also heteroge-
neous firms are founded. These firms must fail on the way to equilibrium, because
for the highest able individual in each team it is always appealing to join a team
with equal (or even higher) ability and to leave the lower able individuals. The
reason is that having a partner with at least equal ability reduces the probability
of firm failure compared to being a member of a heterogeneous team with lower
ability individuals. If abilities only become known gradually over time, the em-
ployment in firms with heterogenous teams might be reduced before the firm is
closed completely. This leads to the fourth hypothesis.
H4: Given start-up size, firms founded by heterogeneous teams experience lower
employment growth than firms founded by homogeneous teams.
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3 Data and variables
3.1 Data
The data set used in this paper is the ZEW-spinoff survey 2001 (Egeln, Gottschalk,
Rammer, and Spielkamp (2002, 2003)). This survey covers firm foundations in
research and knowledge intensive sectors in Germany between 1996 and 2000.
These sectors are
- high technology: sectors with high R&D intensity, e.g. the chemical and
pharmaceutical industry, engineering, and the computer industry,
- technology oriented services: service sectors in which new technologies are
particularly relevant for the business, e.g. software consulting, technical
offices, and research services,
- knowledge intensive services: sectors in which the qualification of the em-
ployees or the use of knowledge is important, e.g. consulting, tax accoun-
tancy, and education.
The ZEW-spinoff survey is sampled from the Mannheim Foundation Panel (MFP)
of the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), which contains almost
all firms founded in Germany since 1989 (Almus, Engel, and Prantl (2000)).
The information on the firms for this panel is made available to the ZEW by
CREDITREFORM, the largest credit rating agency in Germany. In the MFP,
only start-ups with at least one full-time job are included. Changes in legal form
or addresses, foundations of investment companies, and part-time foundations do
not count as firm foundations. For the spinoff survey, a random sample of almost
70,000 firms stratified by the sector groups defined above, foundation year, and
region is drawn. The survey was conducted between October and December 2001
using computer-aided telephone interviews (CATI) and led to a total of 20,241
interviews.
Since the focus of this study is on academic spinoffs, all start-ups which are
not academic spinoffs are discarded from the set of firms. A start-up is defined
as an academic spinoff if at least one of the founders has studied or is currently
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studying at a university or a technical college and if academic skills, new scientific
methods, or new scientific results are essential for the new firm.
By construction of the survey, only firms that survive until 2001 are interviewed.
For the sampled firms that do not survive until 2001, the basic information that
is provided by CREDITREFORM for all firms is available. This information can
be used to correct for the selection bias that arises because employment growth
is not independent of survival. In total, a market exit is observed for 10,498
firms. Since the information relevant for identifying spinoffs is collected during
the telephone interviews, the set of non-surviving firms can only be restricted to
firms which have at least one university graduate among the founders. In the
end, there remain 2,906 surviving firms and 1,752 non-surviving firms for the
analyses, which makes a total of 4,658 firms.
The data for the surviving firms cover the number of employees at start and the
number of employees in 2001. This information can be used to calculate the
average rate of employment from the year of start up to 2001. Additionally, the
data include information on the subjects studied by the founders, the research
institution the founders come from, and facts about the firms, such as the year of
foundation, the size of the foundation team, contacts to the scientific world, and
whether the firm received subsidies. The basic information provided by CREDIT-
REFORM includes the number of employees at start, the year of foundation, the
region in which the firm is located, information about real estate property and
the educational degree of the founders.
3.2 Variables
In addition to the variables describing the general characteristics of the firms, a
number of additional variables is generated that form the core input to the test
of the hypotheses. Due to the character of the information available in the data
set, these variables are all dummy variables.
Generalist : This variable captures whether or not a single entrepreneur has a
broad investment strategy in human capital. It takes the value one if a single
entrepreneur has chosen at least two subjects during her studies. This variable
is relevant for H1a and H1b.
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With this definition, a single entrepreneur is regarded to have a broad investment
strategy if she studied at least two subject regardless of how much related these
subject are. E.g., she is termed a generalist if she studied physics and chemistry.
A less broad definition is to only consider someone having a broad investment
strategy if she studied at least two different subjects from different disciplines,
e.g. natural sciences and business sciences. Therefore, an additional dummy is
constructed taking the value one if a single entrepreneur obtained skills from
at least two different disciplines, which is used alternatively in the regressions.
Table 6 in the appendix shows which subjects and disciplines are considered for
the analysis.
Team: This variable takes the value one if the size of the foundation team amounts
to at least two individuals. This variable is relevant for H2.
Generalistic team: This variable takes the value one if the members of a team
have studied different subjects. It is zero if all team members have studied the
same subject. This variable is relevant for H3.
As in the case of single entrepreneurs, a further dummy variable is generated
which takes the value one only if the team is composed of individuals coming from
different disciplines, e.g., if the team is composed of a physicist and a business
scientist but not if it is composed of a physicist and a chemist.
Homogeneous teams : This variable takes the value one if the firm is founded
by a team and all founders come from the same type of research institution.
For the analyses in this paper, the founders can originate from three types of
research institutions: universities, technical colleges, and non-university research
institutes. The variable takes the value zero if at least two team members come
from different research institutions. This variable relates to H4.
Defining the variable this way is only a crude approximation to the homogeneity
in abilities of the O-ring model applied by Fabel (2004). In this model, ability
corresponds to the probability of performing a task sufficiently well. However,
these probabilities are not observable. In this paper, I use the academic origin
of the founders as a measure of their ability. This is motivated by the fact that
in Germany technical colleges provide more practically oriented and universities
more theoretically oriented education. The education or qualification one ob-
9
tains is therefore likely to be differently demanding in different types of research
institutions.
Although the data is quite extensive, it has some limitations. As Table 6 in the
appendix shows, the information on the subjects is quite detailed but does not
cover the whole variety of study courses in Germany. Especially, study courses
which have a wide focus, such as business informatics (Wirtschaftsinformatik),
cannot be identified. For the analyses, an individual who studied such subjects
appears as someone with a narrow investment strategy although she receives a
rather broad education.
A further drawback of the data is that it is unknown how many team members
studied a given subject. E.g., for a team of three individuals, who studied physics
and engineering, it is unknown whether there are two physicists and one engi-
neer or one physicist and two engineers. Thus, for the analyses it can only be
determined whether or not a team is generalistic. The Herfindahl- or Blau-Index,
which is used as a measure for team heterogeneity in the literature, cannot be
calculated.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regressions. The
majority of the firms in the data set are founded by teams (62 percent), but
a considerable part is also founded by single entrepreneurs (38 percent). The
average number of employees at start is higher for team foundations than for
single entrepreneurs. This is partly due to the fact that the number of employees
is given in full time equivalents including the founders. For the estimations, the
founders are not separated from the employees as the relevant comparison is to
contrast the employment growth of a team with the hypothetical situation that all
team members started as single entrepreneurs. A separation would overestimate
the effect of having a team. Furthermore, the new firms also provide employment
for the founders. In this sense, the founders are also employees of the firms. On
average, a firm founded by a team grows with a higher rate than a firm founded
by a single entrepreneur.
Almost all of the single entrepreneurs in the sample (95 percent) have studied
only one subject. This fraction becomes 96 percent if “generalist” is defined in
terms of disciplines. Among the team foundations, 45 percent have partners with
different backgrounds with respect to subjects studied. Considering disciplines,
10
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
variable single entrepreneurs team foundations
mean std.dev. mean std.dev.
fraction1 0.381 0.619
employment growth 0.155 0.316 0.204 0.334
generalists (subjects) 0.053 0.224
generalists (disciplines) 0.036 0.187
generalistic teams (subjects) 0.449 0.498
generalistic teams (disciplines) 0.372 0.484
homogeneous teams2 0.794 0.404
number of employees at start3 3.311 5.211 5.339 6.882
firm age 3.094 1.373 2.807 1.369
min. labour market experience 8.453 8.986 5.753 7.480
number of contacts to science 1.304 1.648 1.818 1.829
continuous R&D 0.291 0.455 0.381 0.486
occasional R&D 0.131 0.338 0.150 0.357
public support 0.279 0.449 0.320 0.466
high technology 0.153 0.361 0.172 0.377
technology oriented services 0.423 0.494 0.427 0.495
knowledge intensive services 0.423 0.494 0.401 0.490
number of observations 883 1,618
Notes: 1based on 2,620 observations. 2based on 1,508 observations. 3full time equiva-
lents including founders.
Source: ZEW-spinoff survey 2001, author’s calculations.
the fraction of generalistic teams is 37 percent. Regarding the homogeneity of the
ability, 79 percent of the team foundations are set up by partners who originate
from the same type of research institution.
4 Estimation Method
The econometric model for estimating employment growth is related to the frame-
work used by Evans (1987). It is assumed that the relationship between initial
employment and employment in 2001 for firm i can be described as
Et2,i = [G(x
′
iβ)]
t2−t1,iEt1,ii, (1)
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where E denotes employment, t1,i the year of foundation of firm i, t2 the year
of the survey 2001 and  a lognormally distributed error term. The vector x
contains the variables which capture the effects of team foundation, generality
and homogeneity as well as the control variables including a constant. After
taking logs and rearranging the resulting regression equation is
ln(Et2,i)− ln(Et1,i)
t2 − t1,i = ln[G(x
′
iβ)] + ui, (2)
where ui ∼ N(0, σ2i ) and independent of the observed explanatory variables X.
As in Evans (1987), age and initial employment enter the regression equation by
the second order logarithmic expansion
ln(Et1) + ln(age) + ln(Et1) ∗ ln(age) + (ln(Et1))2 + (ln(age))2. (3)
As it is possible that the effects of the central variables are different in each
sector, the key dummy variables defined above are interacted with the industry
dummies. For example, for the hypothesis comparing team foundations with
single entrepreneurs, the regression equation for the growth relationship is
Growth = β0 + β1team in high technology
+ β2team in technology oriented services
+ β3team in knowledge intensive services
+ z′iγ + ui. (4)
The regression equations for the other hypotheses are built equivalently by re-
placing the variables in the first three rows by the respective dummies for the
other hypotheses. The only exception is the estimation of the effect of general-
istic single entrepreneurs. For this relationship, the dummy “generalist” is not
interacted with the industry dummies since the number of generalists is too small
to produce meaningful results at the sectoral level.
The central variables for the analysis in this paper are only available for firms
which survive the whole period from their initiation until 2001. This could give
rise for selection issues since growth is not independent of survival (Dunne et al.
(1989)). Therefore, a sample selection model is estimated.
Growth = ln[G(x′iβ)] + ui (5)
Survival = 1[wiδ + νi > 0], (6)
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where correlation between the error terms ui and νi is permitted. The vector
wi contains variables which influence the survival probability of the firms. These
variables are taken from the basic information provided by CREDITREFORM for
all firms. The model is estimated by applying the two-step procedure proposed
by Heckman (1976, 1979). As exclusion restrictions, the region in which the firms
are located (the German federal states) and real estate property are used.
5 Results
The presentation of the results starts with the effects for the hypothesis comparing
team foundations with single entrepreneurs (H2), because it uses the full sample
and is thus the most encompassing. Then the results concerning the effects of
the heterogeneity in educational backgrounds for single entrepreneurs and team
foundations (H1, H3, and H4) are shown. In order to save space, the results for
the growth regressions are presented in the main text. Table 7 in the appendix
shows the results of the selection equation for the regression comparing team
foundations with single entrepreneurs. The signs of the coefficients are plausible.
Due to the different sample sizes considered, the coefficients in the selection
equation differ between regressions, but yield similar results.
Teams vs. single entrepreneurs. The results of the regression for the hy-
pothesis that team foundations have higher employment growth than single en-
trepreneurs are shown in Table 2. The key coefficients in this case are the ones
relating to the dummies team in high technology, team in technology oriented
services and team in knowledge intensive services.
Team foundations experience higher employment growth than single entrepreneurs.
The coefficient of team in industry j is positive and highly significant. Regard-
ing the magnitude of the effect, it turns out that it is not significantly different
across industries. Running a regression without the sector differentiation yields
that firms founded by a team experience a 7.5 percent higher employment growth
than a firm founded by a single entrepreneur. Thus, H2 cannot be rejected.
Concerning the control variables, the results are consistent with what one would
expect and what has previously been found in the literature. Employment growth
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Table 2: Employment growth of team founda-
tions in comparison to single entrepreneurs
dep. var.: employment growth:
ln(Et2,i)−ln(Et1,i)
t2−t1i
coeff. std. error
team in high technology 0.082*** 0.032
team in technology oriented services 0.070*** 0.021
team in knowledge intensive services 0.077*** 0.020
ln(Et1 ) -0.169*** 0.024
ln(age) -0.108* 0.056
ln(Et1 ) ∗ ln(age) 0.055*** 0.014
(ln(Et1 ))
2 0.015*** 0.006
(ln(age))2 -0.042* 0.024
minimum labour market experience -0.003*** 0.001
number of contacts to science 0.028*** 0.004
continuous R&D 0.075*** 0.015
occasional R&D 0.023 0.018
public support 0.047*** 0.014
ref. cat. high technology
technology-oriented services -0.034 0.030
knowledge-intensive services -0.013 0.031
constant 0.303*** 0.038
λ -0.077 0.048
χ2
(15)
315.93***
number of observations: uncensored 2,620
number of observations: censored 1,559
Notes: ***, **, * depict significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level
respectively.
Source: ZEW-spinoff survey 2001, author’s calculations.
is negatively related to both employment at start and age. The number of con-
tacts to science, the conduction of R&D and the attainment of public support
have all positive and highly significant effects. Somewhat unexpected is the neg-
ative sign of the coefficient for minimum job experience, which is defined as the
difference between the year of foundation and the year in which the last founder
left academia. A possible explanation is that the variable due to its definition
also captures the effect of individuals’ age. Older entrepreneurs probably do not
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tend to expand their firm because they cannot reap the benefits for a sufficiently
long time. These two effects cannot be separated since there is no information
about the age of the individuals in the data set.
Generalists vs. specialists. H1a and H1b contrast single entrepreneurs who
studied several subjects (generalists) and single entrepreneurs who studied only
one subject (specialists). The results of this comparison are shown in Table
3. The columns denoted with (1) show the results for the case that a single
entrepreneur studied at least two subjects and the columns denoted with (2) for
the case that she studied at least two different subjects that are from different
disciplines. The crucial coefficient is the one in the first row.
It turns out that single entrepreneurs who studied several subjects do not have
higher employment growth than single entrepreneurs who studied only one sub-
ject. The coefficient for generalist is insignificant. This result persists if gen-
eralists with respect to disciplines rather than subjects are considered. This is
consistent with H1b but not with H1a.
With respect to the jack-of-all-trades model, there are several explanations for
this result. First, individuals who are entrepreneurs are all jack-of-all-trades
(have a balanced skill profile) but have different investment costs in education.
For some it is worthwhile to invest in more than one skill and for others it is only
reasonable to invest in one of their skills. If it is only relevant for the success of
new firms that individuals are jack-of-all-trades, we should get no effect because
all individuals are in fact equal in the crucial dimension, although we cannot
observe it. This is the explanation based on H1b. Second, it is possible that
also individuals with an imbalanced skill profile are among the founders but they
are able to compensate their disadvantage by, say, a high motivation for being
an entrepreneur or having a broad social network they can rely on. Finally, it
cannot be ruled out that the jack-of-all-trades theory is wrong and that a balanced
skill is not important for successfully running a new firm. In order to determine
whether the jack-of-all-trades theory is not only reasonable for the probability to
become an entrepreneur but also for the success of new firms founded by single
entrepreneurs, more detailed information on the skill profile of the individuals
would be necessary.
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Table 3: Employment growth of generalists in comparison to
specialists
sample: single entrepreneurs
dep. var.: employment growth:
ln(Et2,i)−ln(Et1,i)
t2−t1i
coeff. std. error coeff. std.error
(1) (2)
generalist 0.007 0.045 0.017 0.054
ln(Et1 ) -0.133*** 0.038 -0.133*** 0.038
ln(age) -0.102 0.106 -0.103 0.106
ln(Et1 ) ∗ ln(age) 0.047** 0.022 0.048** 0.022
(ln(Et1 )
2 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.011
(ln(age))2 -0.026 0.048 -0.026 0.048
minimum labour market experience -0.004*** 0.001 -0.004*** 0.001
number of contacts to science 0.034*** 0.007 0.034*** 0.007
continuous R&D 0.055** 0.025 0.055** 0.025
occasional R&D -0.011 0.032 -0.011 0.032
public support 0.049** 0.023 0.049** 0.023
ref. cat. high technology
technology-oriented services -0.043 0.033 -0.043 0.033
knowledge-intensive services -0.016 0.034 -0.016 0.034
constant 0.246*** 0.048 0.246*** 0.048
λ 0.093* 0.054 0.094* 0.054
χ2
(13)
92.31*** 92.40***
number of observations: uncensored 886 886
number of observations: censored 1,559 1,559
Notes: ***, **, * depict significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Columns
denoted with (1): single entrepreneur studied at least two subjects. Columns denoted with
(2): single entrepreneur studied at least two subjects that are from different disciplines.
Source: ZEW-spinoff survey 2001, author’s calculations.
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Generalistic vs. specialised teams. There is also no support for the hypoth-
esis that teams whose members all studied different subjects experience higher
employment growth than teams in which all members have studied the same sub-
ject (H3, Table 4). The crucial coefficient is insignificant in all sectors both when
subjects (columns denoted with (1)) and disciplines (columns denoted with (2))
are considered. Presumably, this is the result of what is called the double-edged
sword of heterogeneity in the literature (Hambrick, Cho, and Chen (1996), Ensley
and Amason (1999)): Different subjects also represent different ways of interpret-
ing the business environment which could lead to misunderstandings and even to
conflict among the team members. This could offset the advantage of having a
broader skill basis due to different educational backgrounds.
Homogeneous vs. heterogeneous teams. The fourth hypothesis contrasts
homogeneous teams with respect to ability with heterogenous teams. The results
of the regression are shown in rows four to six in Table 4. It turns out that the
coefficient for homogeneous teams with respect to ability is insignificant in each
industry. Thus, it is irrelevant whether team members are graduates from only
one type of research institution or whether there is a mix of graduates from differ-
ent research institutions. This result allows two different conclusions concerning
the partnership model of entrepreneurship. Either, there is a measurement prob-
lem. It is possible that the sort of qualification one gets in the different research
institution does not measure ability differences adequately. Or, the theory is
false. In this case, tasks are not as essential as assumed in the partnership model
of entrepreneurship so that it is better to have a mixed team with respect to
ability. The latter is the case if some tasks can be assigned to rather low ability
individuals since these individuals are cheaper. In Mu¨ller (2009), I use lifetime
wages as a measure of ability in a regression on the determinants of the survival
probability of young firms. There is again no effect of the degree of homogene-
ity with respect to ability detectable. Thus, the evidence suggests that the the
second conclusion mentioned above must be drawn.
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Table 4: Employment growth of generalistic (homogeneous) teams in
comparison to specialised (heterogeneous) teams
sample: team foundations
dep. var.: employment growth:
ln(Et2,i)−ln(Et1,i)
t2−t1i
coeff. std. error coeff. std. error
(1) (2)
generalistic team in high technology -0.029 0.039 -0.039 0.040
generalistic team in technology oriented services 0.015 0.025 0.010 0.025
generalistic team in knowledge intensive services -0.005 0.026 -0.004 0.026
homogeneous team in high technology 0.036 0.049 0.038 0.049
homogeneous team in technology oriented services 0.020 0.031 0.021 0.031
homogeneous team in knowledge intensive services 0.024 0.031 0.023 0.030
ln(Et1 ) -0.267*** 0.037 -0.266*** 0.037
ln(age) -0.128* 0.073 -0.129* 0.073
ln(Et1 ) ∗ ln(age) 0.081*** 0.021 0.081*** 0.021
(ln(Et1 )
2 0.034*** 0.010 0.033*** 0.010
(ln(age))2 -0.060** 0.031 -0.059** 0.031
minimum labour market experience -0.004*** 0.001 -0.004*** 0.001
number of contacts to science 0.026*** 0.005 0.026*** 0.005
continuous R&D 0.079*** 0.019 0.079*** 0.019
occasional R&D 0.039* 0.024 0.039* 0.024
public support 0.044*** 0.018 0.044*** 0.018
ref. cat. high technology
technology-oriented services -0.051 0.059 -0.046 0.056
knowledge-intensive services 0.000 0.060 0.000 0.057
constant 0.478*** 0.067 0.477*** 0.065
λ 0.033 0.044 0.034 0.044
χ2
(18)
228.20*** 228.40***
number of observations: uncensored 1,504 1,504
number of observations: censored 1,559 1,559
Notes: ***, **, * depict significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Columns denoted with (1):
at least two team members studied different subjects. Columns denoted with (2): at least two team members
studied different subjects that from different disciplines.
Source: ZEW-spinoff survey 2001, author’s calculations.
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Table 5: Employment growth of teams with technical and business skills in
comparison to teams with technical but without business skills
sample: team foundations
dep. var.: employment growth:
ln(Et2,i)−ln(Et1,i)
t2−t1i
coeff. std. error coeff. std. error
(1) (2)
team foundations with natural and business scientists 0.039 0.033
team foundations with engineers and business scientists 0.082*** 0.032
ln(Et1 ) -0.319*** 0.068 -0.194*** 0.048
ln(age) -0.203* 0.115 -0.218* 0.115
ln(Et1 ) ∗ ln(age) 0.101*** 0.035 0.046* 0.027
(ln(Et1 )
2 0.030* 0.018 0.027** 0.012
(ln(age))2 -0.034 0.052 0.005 0.049
minimum labour market experience -0.004* 0.002 -0.003** 0.001
number of contacts to science 0.026*** 0.008 0.017*** 0.007
continuous R&D 0.107** 0.034 0.039 0.028
occasional R&D 0.058 0.042 0.005 0.034
public support 0.095*** 0.030 0.064*** 0.026
ref. cat. high technology
technology-oriented services -0.047 0.037 -0.060* 0.032
knowledge-intensive services -0.003 0.046 -0.060 0.039
constant 0.578*** 0.080 0.438*** 0.068
λ -0.018 0.051 0.083* 0.051
χ2
(15)
120.55*** 80.94***
number of observations: uncensored 637 614
number of observations: censored 1,559 1,559
Notes: ***, **, * depict significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
Source: ZEW-spinoff survey 2001, author’s calculations.
Natural scientists and engineers with business scientists. A conjecture
often put forward in discussions is that teams whose members attained technical
skills perform better if they form a team with someone with commercial skills.
Table 5 shows the results for the comparison between teams of natural scientists
and engineers with and without business scientists, respectively. For natural
scientists, it does not seem to make any difference whether or not they have a
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business scientist among them, but for engineers it does. Teams of engineers with
business scientists experience a 9 percent higher employment growth than teams
of engineers without business scientists.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, I analyse how employment growth of academic spin-offs is affected
by the degree of heterogeneity in the educational backgrounds of the founders and
the size of the founding team. As theoretical basis, the approaches by Lazear
(2005) and Fabel (2004) are used. The results show that it is relevant that a
firm is founded by a team. Additionally, there is evidence that engineers should
choose business scientists as partners for setting up a successful firm. However,
different subjects per se do not play a role, neither for single entrepreneurs nor
for team foundations. For team foundations, it is also irrelevant whether or not
all founders come from the same type of research institution.
For the design of academic curricula, the results suggest that the success of aca-
demic spinoffs cannot be fostered by organising curricula interdisciplinary. It is
only important that several persons meet each other. This can happen in different
ways and does not depend on the concrete design of curricula. University-wide
social events or even events outside the university would also serve the purpose.
With respect to the jack-of-all-trades model (Lazear (2005)) and the partnership
model of entrepreneurship (Fabel (2004)), the empirical results seem to cast some
doubts on the validity of these approaches. But it is possible that the rejection
of most of the hypotheses is due to measurement problems. The crucial variables
of the models – the skill profile in the jack-of-all-trades model and the ability
of the individuals in the partnership model of entrepreneurship – are both not
directly observed in the data. It could be the case that the measures used in this
paper do not proxy these variables sufficiently well. Definite conclusions can only
be drawn if the results of this paper are replicated with other measures of these
variables.
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Appendix
Table 6: Subjects and disciplines
subjects disciplines
biology natural sciences
chemistry
computer sciences
math
physics
other natural sciences
medicine
mechanical engineering engineering
electrical engineering
construction engineering
other engineering
business sciences business sciences
social sciences social sciences
law/humanities/languages
other other
Source: ZEW-spinoff survey 2001.
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Table 7: Selection equation
coeff. std.err.
Et1 0.103*** 0.008
(Et1)2 -0.001*** 0.000
ref. cat. age: 1 year
age: 2 years -1.894*** 0.191
age: 3 years -2.129*** 0.190
age: 4 years -2.256*** 0.190
age: 5 years -2.458*** 0.190
ref. cat. thuringia
schleswig-holstein -0.628**** 0.195
hamburg 0.117 0.190
lower saxony/bremen -0.307** 0.156
north-rhine westphalia -0.432*** 0.145
hesse -0.503*** 0.156
rhineland-palatinate/saarland -0.351** 0.167
baden-wurttemberg -0.252* 0.149
bavaria -0.443*** 0.147
berlin -0.343** 0.163
brandenburg -0.308* 0.181
mecklenburg-western pomerania 0.225 0.256
saxony -0.184 0.166
saxony-anhalt -0.256 0.191
professor or doctor (PhD) among founders 0.104* 0.055
real estate property 0.046 0.088
real estate property belonging to firm 0.090 0.270
real estate property missing -0.265 0.166
equity holding by other firm -0.154** 0.066
ref. cat. high technology
technology oriented services -0.178*** 0.071
knowledge intensive services -0.396*** 0.070
constant 2.702*** 0.239
number of observations 1,559
Notes: ***, **, * depict significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level re-
spectively. Values refer to the regression comparing teams with single
entrepreneurs.
Source: ZEW-spinoff survey 2001, author’s calculations.
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